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Abstract: This paper develops a hedonic model of job security (JS). Workers with hetero-
geneous JS-preferences pay the hedonic price for JS to employers, who incur labor-hoarding 
costs from supplying JS. In contrast to the Wage-Bill Argument, equilibrium unemployment is 
strictly positive, as workers with weak JS-preferences trade JS for higher wages. The relation 
between optimal job insecurity and the perceived dismissal probability is hump-shaped. If 
firms observe demand, but workers do not, separation is not contractible and firms dismiss 
workers at-will. Although the workers are risk-averse, they respond to the one-sided private 
information by trading wage-risk for a higher JS. With two-sided private information, even 
JS-neutral workers pay the price for a JS guarantee, if their risk premium associated with the 
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I  Introduction 
Many believe that globalization and ICT progress have significantly increased job insecurity 
(JI) over the past decades. Empirical labor market research has investigated the issue since the 
1990s and tested the hypotheses of an upward JI-trend for the labor markets in the USA, UK 
and continental Europe, but did not come up with conclusive results. One possible reason for 
this mixed evidence for or against the JI-hypotheses could be that there is no economic theory 
of JI. Is job security (JS) an endogenous job characteristic or is JI a result of exogenous forces 
of culture, aggregate demand or supply shocks or the legal system?  
This lack of theory is the more noteworthy, because JS ranks among the “very important” 
job characteristics just below or even higher than the wage, the career chances and the hours 
worked, as is shown by the US General Social Survey (GSS), the widespread call for private 
and public employment protection, the demand for public sector jobs or for work contracts 
with job security guarantees. The significance of JS is also reflected in the substantial amount 
of JS research in psychology1, sociology2 and economics (see Section 2) since at least the 
1980s. 
There are many reasons why workers demand JS and in particular, JS guarantees. A stable 
employment relation is the basis for a steady income stream, provides information about job 
vacancies, career paths, wages and fringe benefits or creates emotional utility from socializing 
with the worker community of a firm. Moreover, participation is an important means to gain 
and signal social status (Becker et al. 2005). These and other benefits are threatened, if the 
employment relation is terminated. We call the welfare loss associated with the transition 
from employment to unemployment the “scar of unemployment”. The far-reaching importance 
of the scar has also been emphasized by the happiness research and the research over the scar 
of unemployment3.  
Our paper is an attempt to fill the gap in economic theory. We assume that JS is an endoge-
nous job attribute, comparable to the wage or hours, which is traded on the hedonic market for 
job characteristics. The perceived scar of unemployment generates the JS preferences of a 
worker. The hedonic price for JS reflects ceteris paribus the JS preferences and the labor-
hoarding costs of the firms providing JS. The paper builds on both the theory of hedonic mar-
                                                 
1   De Witte 1999, Isaksson et al. 2003, Sverke et al. 2006 
2   Kalleberg et al. 2000, Burchell et al. 2001, Burgard et al. 2006, Giddens and Birdsall 2006 
3   Ruhm 1991, Clark and Oswald 1994, Winkelmann et al. 1998, Arulampalam et al. 2001a, b, Clark 2001, Clark et 
al. 2001, Di Tella et al. 2001, Frey and Stutzer 2002, Rogerson and Schindler 2002, Farber 2005, Oreopoulos et al. 
2005, Clark et al. 2007.  
  3 
kets4 and the theory of implicit contracts5. The market system is incomplete. Hidden informa-
tion or hidden action prevent the risk-averse workers from buying insurance against the risks 
of job loss. The labor contract is the only means available to a worker to accomplish protec-
tion against the risks of a dismissal. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents results from the empirical JS re-
search. Section III introduces the JS model with symmetric information and derives the offer 
curve for JS. The offer curve spans a continuum of severance pay contracts (SPC), which con-
verge to the guaranteed employment contract (GEC) that firms supply to workers with particu-
larly strong JS preferences. In the symmetric information equilibrium, all workers are fully in-
sured against the wage-risk, but only one part is willing to pay the hedonic price for the JS 
guarantee of the GEC. The other part with weaker JS preferences trades JS for a higher wage 
and accepts a strictly positive dismissal probability. Thus, contrary to the Wage-Bill Argument 
of Akerlof and Miyazaki (1980), the unemployment rate in the symmetric information equilib-
rium of the JS model is strictly positive. Section IV addresses the case of private information 
on the demand. JS is not contractible, firms terminate workers at will and the first-best SPCs 
of the JS seekers are not incentive compatible. To contain the perceived JI, the risk-averse 
workers trade wage risk for a higher JS. 
In Section V, we introduce in addition private information on the re-employment status of a 
dismissed worker. Supplemental unemployment benefits are not contractible and terminated 
workers face a wage-replacement risk. With two-sided private information, even JS-neutral 
workers are willing to pay the price for a JS guarantee, if their risk premium associated with 
the wage-replacement risk is larger than the social net loss from production. In this case, the 
labor market equilibrium is indeed a “fixed-wage-cum-full-employment equilibrium” (Akerlof 
and Miyazaki 1980).  
Although it is a common view that a higher aggregate JI is associated with a significant 
welfare loss, the JS model does not support this intuition. First, JS is endogenous. Second, 
comparing, for example, the common knowledge equilibrium with the one-sided private in-
formation equilibrium discloses that only a fraction of workers is confronted with higher JI in 
the second best situation, the others enjoy a strictly higher JS. Section VI summarizes the re-
sults; the Appendix provides proofs of the propositions. 
                                                 
4   Rosen (1974, 1986), Ekeland et al. (2004). 
5   Baily (1974), Azariadis (1975), Grossman and Hart (1981, 1983), Hart (1983), Kahn (1985), Rosen (1985).  
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II  Literature 
As basic economic theory provides no measure for JI, empirical research has developed vari-
ous concepts of subjective or objective JI. Objective JI is derived from macroeconomic data, 
and survey data are used for the measurement of subjective JI. Nickell et al. (2002) define JI 
as the fear by workers of substantial income losses “whether or not they lose their job” (p. 3). 
The authors follow Gottschalk and Moffitt (1999) in assuming that the probability of a job 
loss derived from macro data, the costs of unemployment and the probability of real wage 
losses in the same job can be used to estimate the volatility and trend of JI. Nickell et al. find 
that JI increased for British men between 1982 and 1996, but not due to increased probability 
of a job loss, but rather due to higher costs of unemployment. In contrast, Gottschalk and 
Moffitt do not find an upward trend of JI in any of the three dimensions in the US labor mar-
ket between 1981 and 1995. According to Green (2003), JI correlates with four factors. JI in-
creases, if the probability and the costs of a job loss increase or if the likelihood of a wage loss 
in the same job rises. Green found no surge in JI in the US or in the UK during the 90s.  
Manski and Straub (2000) and Manski (2004) develop a composite probabilistic measure of 
JI on the basis of the Survey of Economic Expectation (SEE), which weights the perceived 
probability of a job loss within the next 12 months with the probability of not finding a com-
parable new job. The composite measure of JI of our JS-model is similar to the measure used 
by Manski and Straub (2000). Bryson et al. (2004) and Bryson and White (2006) suggest that 
employers offer JSGs to reduce labor turnover and turnover costs. An increase of the per-
ceived JI as a consequence of, for example, organizational change raises labor turnover, while 
JSGs reduce feelings of job insecurity and contain the number of quits. The authors find, 
based on the data of the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), that the 
JS-policies of the firms are indeed negatively correlated to perceived JI.  
Aaronson and Sullivan (1998) use data from the GSS and find a negative, but insignificant 
association between perceived JI and US wage growth in the 1990s. Schmidt (1999) also uses 
GSS data to test for an upward trend in perceived JI, measured by the expectation of a job loss 
during the next 12 months that would have resulted in a wage reduction or a spell of unem-
ployment due to termination. Compared to the recoveries of the late 1970s and late 1980s, the 
author finds a significant increase in perceived JI for the recovery years 1993-96. In addition, 
the analysis of the period from 1977 to 1997 uncovers a close positive correlation between the 
perceived probability of a job loss and the volatility of the unemployment rate.  
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Erlinghagen (2007) uses data of the European Social Survey (ESS) to show that there are 
significant differences among the 17 countries in the EU regarding the perceived JI, which the 
author ascribes to institutional differences (employment law) and “country-specific anxiety 
cultures”. Erlinghagen finds in particular a positive association between the fraction of long-
term unemployed and perceived JI. Thus, one should expect that European countries with 
strict employment protection legislation (EPL) would have particularly high levels of per-
ceived JI. However, Erlinghagen’s results do not confirm this expectation; to the contrary, the 
author shows that the prevailing EPL has no significant influence on perceived JI. On the 
other hand, Clark and Postel-Vinay (2005) conclude from the data of the European Commu-
nity Household Panel (ECHP) for twelve countries of the EU that more stringent EPL lowers 
the perceived JS significantly, whereas the generosity of the unemployment insurance benefits 
is positively associated with perceived JS. 
Valetta (1999) appears to be the only theoretical model that analyzes the economic implica-
tions of JS. The author classifies his JS model, which is a simplified version of Ramey and 
Watson (1997), as an implicit contract model of JS. Valetta argues that the desire for JS arises 
only in a world with inefficient separations. The worker would prefer to continue, but the firm 
terminates the employment relation. If all separations are efficient, “job security is irrelevant” 
(p. S172). There are two types of labor contracts and two states. The robust contracts are 
linked to specific investments that permit the continuation of a match in the good as well as in 
the bad state. For the fragile contract, the specific investment is just sufficient to produce in 
the good state. In a recession, even though the joint return of the match is positive and it 
would be efficient to maintain the job, the employment relationship is dissolved because one 
of the contracting parties will succumb to the temptation to shirk. Shirking will be detected 
immediately and will lead to separation. The incidence of fragile contracts and thus JI will in-
crease, if the value of the outside options of the respective shirker rises, the probability of a 
recession decreases and the probability of re-employment after separation increases. 
III  The Model 
1  Sequence of Events 
There are two labor markets, a spot market and a contract market. On the spot market, the 
wage, the wage-replacement payments and the probability to become unemployed are exoge-
nous.  Workers  face  uninsurable  wage-risk  and  exogenous  JI.  On  the  contract  market,  the 
wages, wage-replacement payments and individual JI are endogenous. The only difference be- 
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tween the two market types is the endogeneity of the wage, the wage-risk and the individual 
JI. 
Why a spot market? First, dismissed workers search on the spot market for a new job. Thus, 
as suggested by Manski and Straub (2000, Manski 2004), we can make use of composite 
measures of individual and aggregate JI that are functions of the chance of a recession, the 
perceived probability of separation and the chance of finding re-employment. Second, the spot 
market assures that the entire labor force will conclude a labor contract. Thus, the decision to 
close a labor contract in order to insure one’s income and to protect against JI is endogenous 
and socially efficient. Finally, the spot market allows us to analyze the effects of two-sided 
private information with uninsurable wage-risk for the equilibrium JI allocation. 
Spot Market. The model is static. A worker may search the spot market at any time during 
the period. If he opts for the spot market, he will find a job with probability  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ p  due to 
search frictions, or he will become unemployed and suffer the scar of unemployment other-
wise. v is the spot market wage. The unemployed receive unemployment benefits b. Thus, 
workers, who opt for the spot market, have an expected income equal to b p pv IS ) 1 ( − + = . 
Firms have a constant returns-to-scale technology that uses only labor, where y is the capacity 
output of a job-worker pair. We assume for the “replacement incomes” b and v that 
(A1)  y v b ≤ < ≤ 0 . 
Contract Market. The sequence of events consists of three stages. Jobs with a contract are 
available only at stage 0. The market offers two contract forms. The GEC specifies a wage and 
a job-security guarantee, where we exclude the case of nonperformance by assumption. The 
terms of a SPC depend on the presumed information structure. With symmetric information, 
the SPC defines a severance pay A and supplemental unemployment benefits (SUB) B, in ad-
dition to the wage w. A separation clause completes the SPC. The clause specifies a reserva-
tion demand yR at which firm and worker separate when the job is hit by an adverse shock at 
stage  1  and  demand  falls  below  yR.  Based  on  the  observed  demand  yx,  the firm decides 
whether  to  produce  ( R x ≥ )  or  to  terminate  the  job  and  to  disburse  the  severance  pay  A 
( R x < ). 
At stage 2, a released worker searches for a new job on the spot market. He fails to find a 
job and becomes unemployed with probability p − 1 . An unemployed worker receives SUB B 
from his former employer in addition to the unemployment benefits b. The income of the un- 
  7 
employed is thus equal to b B A + + , while the earnings of a terminated worker, who did find a 
new job, amount to v A+ . 
At the last stage, the jobless experience the scar of unemployment, an adverse idiosyncratic 
shock to the welfare of the unemployed worker. 
2  Profit and Utility Function 
Demand shocks. y is the capacity output of a filled job in the good state. Demand shocks ar-
rive with probability ) 1 , 0 ( ∈ λ . The output of a job hit by a shock is yx, where x is drawn from 
a general distribution G with support 1 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ x α . We assume throughout that G is common 
knowledge. The shock x has a probability density g with  0 ) ( ) ( > ′ = x G x g  for all ] 1 , [α ∈ x , so 
that 1 < < µ α , where µ is the mean of the shock distribution. When characterizing the hedonic 
price function, we assume also that the density function g is differentiable. 
Contract. An employment contract  ] , [ λ C w C =  consists of the wage w, which is paid in the 
good state, and a real-valued function 4 ] 1 , [ : R → α λ C , which specifies the contract provisions 
in case of a demand recession.  )] ( ), ( ), ( ), ( [ ) ( x B x A x x r x C ω λ =  are the provisions conditional 
on the occurrence of the recession state ] 1 , [α ∈ x . The indicator function r specifies whether 
the job will produce ( 1 ) ( = x r ) and the worker is paid the wage  ) (x ω , or whether the job is 
closed down ( 0 ) ( = x r ) and the worker receives the severance pay  ) (x A  and the option to 
claim  ) (x B , if he does not find a new job and becomes unemployed.  
Profit and Utility Function. The ex ante expected profit of a risk-neutral firm bound to the 
contract  ] , [ λ C w C =  is  
  ∫ − + − − − + − − =
1
) ( )]] ( ) 1 ( ) ( ))[ ( 1 ( )] ( )[ ( [ ) )( 1 ( ) (
α
ω λ λ x dG x B p x A x r x yx x r w y C J . 
In the good state, the profit of the firm is  w y − . If the job is hit by a shock x and the con-
tract stipulates production, the profit is  ) (x yx ω − . If  0 ) ( = x r , the parties separate and the 
profit is equal to the termination costs  )] ( ) 1 ( ) ( [ x B p x A − + − .  
The worker is either employed or unemployed. If employed, his end-of-period utility from 
consuming c is  ) (c u . If unemployed, his end-of-period utility is  ) , ( ζ υ c , where ζ is the scar of 
unemployment. The utility functions u and υ fulfill the assumption:  
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(A2)  R R → + : u , the von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of the employed, is a 
2 C  
function with  0 > ′ u  and  0 < ′ ′ u . The utility function of the unemployed,  + + ×R R : υ R → , is 
quasi-linear with respect to the scar of unemployment,  ζ ζ υ − = ) ( ) , ( c u c . The scar  0 ≥ ζ  is a 
worker-specific random variable with distribution function Z and mean  = z 0 ) ( 0 ≥ ∫
∞ ζ ζdZ . 
If a worker signs the contract  ] , [ λ C w C = , his ex ante expected utility is 
  ∫ − + + − =
1
) ( )] ), ( ), ( ( )) ( 1 ( )) ( ( ) ( [ ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
α
ω λ λ x dG z x B x A V x r x u x r w u C U . 
In the good state, the budget of the worker is  w c = , and his utility is  ) (w u . If the job is hit 
by a shock x and the contract stipulates production, the firm pays the remuneration  ) (x ω  and 
the utility of the worker is  )) ( ( x u ω . If  0 ) ( = x r , the job is closed down, and the terminated 
worker moves to the spot market to look for a new job. With probability p, he finds a job with 
wage v. Together with the severance pay  ) (x A , his consumption is  v x A x c + = ) ( ) (  and his ex 
post utility  ) ) ( ( v x A u + . With probability  p − 1 , he becomes unemployed. As the contract 
stipulates  the  severance  pay  ) (x A   and  the  SUB  ) (x B ,  his  consumption  is 
= ) (x c b x B x A + + ) ( ) ( . Accounting for the scar, his ex post utility is  ζ b x B x A u − + + ) ) ( ) ( ( . 
Hence, the ex ante expected utility conditional on termination is 
  ] ) ) ( ) ( ( )[ 1 ( ) ) ( ( ) ), ( ), ( ( z b x B x A u p v x A pu z x B x A V − + + − + + = . 
JS-seeker. Our ζ-theory presupposes that the additive scar of unemployment is exogenous 
and resembles a negative termination externality, which causes material or psychic costs. The 
jobless compare their deprived status with their self-perception or with the socio-economic 
status of a reference group and, as in the literature on the happiness research, suffer ceteris 
paribus a welfare loss equal to  0 ≥ ζ . The scarring effect could depend, for example, on the 
employment career of the worker, on his age and education, on his family status, on the local 
unemployment rate or on private or social norms6. We consider this heterogeneity by assum-
ing different worker types  0 ≥ z , where F is the distribution function of the scar z. 
) (z F  is the proportion of workers who expect a scar equal to or less than z. Presumably, F 
has a point mass at  0 = z , such that  0 ) 0 ( 0 > ≡ F F , given that not all jobless will suffer a scar 
of unemployment.  0 F  is the proportion of JS-neutral workers. In contrast to the JS-neutral 
workers, the JS seekers expect a scar of unemployment  0 > z  and are looking ex ante for pro-
                                                 
6   Clark and Oswald (1994), Clark et al. (2001), Böckerman (2002), Stutzer and Lalive (2004), Layard (2005).  
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tection  from  the  welfare  loss  caused  by  z.  We  assume  that  the  proportion  of  JS  seekers, 
0 0 1 F F − = − , is strictly larger than zero  0
0 > − F . Neoclassical labor market theory generally 
assumes that  1 0 = F  and thus  0
0 = − F , so that all neoclassical workers belong to the JS-
neutral type. 
3  Risk-Efficient Labor Contracts 
With symmetrical information, the expected utility of a worker is additively separable in the 
wage-risk and JI, as will be shown shortly. Therefore, we will discuss first the optimal insur-
ance conditions and afterwards the conditions for the optimal JS for a given worker type. Note 
that risk-neutral firms in a competitive market will implement the optimal full insurance con-
ditions without compensation, but will charge the workers the hedonic price for providing the 
employee-specific optimal dismissal rules.  
Lagrangian function. Because workers can opt for either the spot or the contract market, the 
utility from searching the spot market  ) (z V , where  ] ) ( )[ 1 ( ) ( ) ( z b u p v pu z V − − + = , is the 
reservation utility for all worker types  0 ≥ z . Before we demonstrate (see Proposition 2) that 
the expected utility from a contract job is strictly larger than  ) (z V  for all  0 ≥ z , we will first 
present characteristics of the set of efficient employment contracts.  
An employment contract  ] , [ λ C w C =  is called efficient with respect to a worker of type z, if 
C maximizes the ex ante expected utility  ) (C U  of z subject to the a non-negative profit con-
straint for the employer of z,  0 ) ( ≥ C J .  + = ) ( ) , ( C U C δ L ) (C J δ  is the Lagrangian of the 
maximization problem, and  0 ≥ δ  is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the participa-
tion constraint. The Lagrangian is a concave function of the contract terms with the following 
first-order conditions (FOC) for an interior solution 
  0 ] ) ( )[ 1 ( = − ′ − =
∂
∂




  0 ] )) ( ( )[ (
) (









  0 ] ) ) ( ) ( ( ) 1 ( ) ) ( ( ))[ ( 1 (
) (
= − + + ′ − + + ′ − =
∂
∂




  0 ] ) ) ( ) ( ( )[ 1 ))( ( 1 (
) (
= − + + ′ − − =
∂
∂




Inspection of the FOC yields the following results 
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LEMMA 1. (i) The Lagrangian multiplier δ is equal to the marginal utility of consumption in 
the good state, where  0 ) ( > = ′ δ w u , given (A2). (ii) If production occurs in a recession state x, 
then  1 ) ( = x r   and  δ ω = ′ )) ( ( x u .  (iii)  If  the  job  is  closed  down,  then  0 ) ( = x r   and 
+ ′ = + ′ ) ( ( ) ) ( ( x A u v x A u δ b x B = + ) ) ( . Therefore, the following full insurance conditions for 
the worker’s income risk hold 
(1)  b B A v A I B p A ω w S + + = + = + − + = = ) 1 ( . 
An ex ante risk-efficient employment contract fully shifts the consumption risk of the risk-
averse worker to the risk-neutral firm. The contract wages w and ω, the severance pay A, and 
the SUB B are all state independent, while the marginal utility of consumption is equal in all 
possible states, which in turn implies the full insurance conditions (1). The ex ante expected 
wage-replacement  rate,  which  relates  the  expected  replacement  income  of  a  terminated 
worker,  S I B p A + − + ) 1 ( , to his contract wage w, is equal to one. Likewise, the ex post re-
placement rates, which relate the income of a terminated worker, who found a spot market 
job,  v A+ , or who became unemployed,  b B A + + , to his contract wage, are both equal to 
one.  
Reservation productivity. To characterize the optimal ex ante separation clause, assume that 
] , [ λ C w C =  is a risk-efficient contract for worker  0 ≥ z . Furthermore, assume that the job is 
hit by a shock  ] 1 , [α ∈ x . If production occurs, firm and worker earn the joint return yx. If firm 
and worker separate, their joint expected income is  S I . Thus,  ) (x h , with  S I yx x h − = ) ( , is 
the social net return from continuing the job. For the continuation rent  ) (x h , we assume 
(A3)  ) 1 ( 0 ) ( h h < < α . 
The inequality on the right side follows from (A1); the inequality on the left can be justified 
as follows. If the continuation rent is positive for all  ] 1 , [α ∈ x , such that  0 ) ( ≥ α h , then the set 
of efficient labor contracts consists only of the GEC, as we will show below. Thus, firms in an 
economy with  0 ) ( ≥ α h  bear no labor-hoarding costs, so that they supply JS as a free service.  
Given (A3), the continuation rent  ) (x h  has an interior zero at a point  ) 1 , (α ∈ m R . Let the 
wage w and the endogenous replacement payments of contract C, A and B, be given. Then, 
given  (A3),  the  following  lemma  characterizes  the  reservation  property  of  the  separation 
clause of C.  
 
LEMMA 2. (i) The worker  0 ≥ z  favors production to separation for all  ] 1 , [α ∈ x , the prefer-
ence being strict, if the worker is a JS seeker, such that  0 > z . (ii) The employer of z prefers 
production in all states  ≥ x m R  and strictly prefers separation, if  m R x < . (iii) Therefore, re- 
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gardless of the worker type z,  1 ) ( = x r  holds, whenever  m R x ≥ . (iv) In addition, for all  0 ≥ z , 
there is a unique reservation productivity  ) (z R  depending on z, with  m R z R ≤ ≤ ) ( α , such that 
⇔ =1 ) (x r ) (z R x ≥ . 
 
Job Security. Due to the reservation property of the termination clause and the full insur-
ance conditions (1), the terms of an efficient employment contract for a worker of type  0 ≥ z  
are uniquely determined by the contract wage w and the reservation productivity R, which are 
both functions of z. Consequently, we obtain the ex ante expected utility of z from 
(2) 
z p R G w u
x dG z x B x A V x dG x u w u R w U
R
R
) 1 )( ( ) (
) ( ) ), ( ), ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) , (
1
− − =
∫ + ∫ + − =
λ
λ ω λ λ
α . 
The expected utility is the sum of the utility from consumption  ) (w u  and the job insecurity 
z R z JI ) ( ) ( ϕ = , where  ) 1 )( ( ) ( p R G R − = λ ϕ . As in Manski and Straub (2000) and Manski 
(2004)  ) (R ϕ  is a composite probabilistic measure of the event that the job of z will fall into a 
recession, the labor contract will be terminated, z will not find a new job and will eventually 
become unemployed. 
We will show below that the reservation productivity  ) (z R  is a decreasing function of the 
expected scar of unemployment. In combination with F, the distribution function of z, we thus 
obtain the following measure Г for the aggregate JI: 





z dF z z R z
0
) ( )) ( ( ) ( . 
By the fact that  ] 1 , [ ) ( α ∈ z R  is strictly decreasing, it is the case that we can divide the con-
tinuum of worker types  ) , 0 [ ∞ ∈ z  into two disjunct and connected subsets. Only the workers 
of type  ) , 0 [ α z z∈  face JI, whereas the workers of type  ) , [ ∞ ∈ α z z  will conclude a JS guaran-
tee. We will characterize the marginal worker type  α z  below. 
The ex ante expected profit of a job bound to the efficient contract  ) (z C  is 
(3) 
) , ( ) (
) ( ] ) 1 ( [ ) ( ) ( ) )( 1 ( ) , (
1
R w l R Y




∫ − + − ∫ − + − − =
α
λ ω λ λ
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where  ) (R Y  is the ex ante expected revenue with  = ) (R Y + − ) 1 [( λ y )] (R λµ  and  = ) (R µ  
∫
1 ) ( R x dG x , and  ) , ( R w l  are the ex ante expected labor costs. Labor costs l consist of wage and 
termination  costs:  + − = w R G l )) ( 1 ( λ ] ) 1 ( )[ ( B p A R G − + λ .  Considering  the  full  insurance 
conditions (1), we can rewrite the termination costs to derive  − = w l ≡ S I R G λ ) ( ) , ( R w l . 
Labor-Hoarding Costs. Both the revenue and the labor costs are strictly decreasing func-
tions of R, as  0 ) ( ) ( < − = ′ yR R g R Y λ  and  0 ) ( ) , ( < − = S R I R g λ R w l , where  ) , ( R w lR  denotes 
the partial derivative of the labor cost function with respect to R. Considering (A3), the mar-
ginal revenue is strictly larger than the marginal labor costs for all  ) , [ m R R α ∈ . Thus, the 
marginal  profit  is  strictly  larger  than  zero,  = ) (R JR 0 ) ( ) ( > − R h R g λ ,  if  ) , [ m R R α ∈ , and 
strictly smaller than zero, if  ] 1 , ( m R R∈ . Hence  ) , ( R w J  has a maximum at  ) 1 , (α ∈ m R . 
We can now define the labor-hoarding costs  ) (R H  of a firm that pays the wage w and that 









] , [ for ), , ( ) , (
) (




) (R H  measures the foregone profit of a firm that sacrifices the chance to dismiss workers 
at-will and agrees by contract to implement a termination rule with reservation productivity 
] , [ m R R α ∈ .  Apparently  0 ) ( ) ( = ′ = m m R H R H ,  while  0 ) ( > R H   and  0 ) ( < ′ R H   for  all 
) , [ m R R α ∈ . 
The Wage-Bill Argument. If  0 ) ( > x h , then the marginal profit  = ) (x JR 0 ) ( ) ( < − x h x g λ  is 
strictly negative. Thus, the profit of the firm has a boundary maximum at  α = R , if the strictly 
increasing  and  continuous  joint  net  return  ) (x h   for  all  ] 1 , (α ∈ x   is  positive,  such  that 
0 ) ( ≥ α h .  Given  the  fact  that  the  marginal  utility  of  R  is  non-positive  on  ] 1 , [α , 
0 ) 1 )( ( / ≤ − − = ∂ ∂ z p R g R U λ , the GEC with the reservation productivity  α = R  is the only 
efficient  labor  contract,  and  the  labor  market  equilibrium  is  a  “fixed-wage-cum-full-
employment equilibrium” (Akerlof and Miyazaki 1980).  
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4  Hedonic Price of Job Security 
The endogenous variable through which a JS seeker implements his privately optimal JS is the 
reservation productivity R. R determines  ) 1 )( ( ) ( p R G R − = λ ϕ , which is the composite prob-
ability of becoming unemployed and suffering the scar of unemployment.  
First, we will discuss the bid prices, which reflect the willingness of workers to pay for al-
ternative values of R. The bid price in turn determines the bid wage. A bid wage is the lowest 
wage demanded by a worker for a contract with reservation productivity R und a JI determined 
by  ) (R ϕ . Next, we introduce the offer prices of the firms. An offer price is the lowest price 
demanded by firms to cover the labor-hoarding costs incurred by implementing the job char-
acteristic R. The offer price determines the offer wage, which is the highest wage firms are 
prepared to offer for a labor contract with reservation productivity R.  
Bid wage. Both workers and firms behave as price takers in the hedonic market for JS. The 
workers, who are productively homogeneous, earn the equilibrium wage  m w  and pay the he-
donic price  ) (R P  for job characteristic R and thus earn the (net) wage  ) ( ) ( R P w R w m − = . 
Workers of type z are willing to pay the bid price  ) , ; ( z U R θ  for job characteristic R at 
given utility level U. The bid function is implicitly defined by  z R w u U m ) ( ) ( ϕ θ − − = , where 
) ( θ − m w u  is the utility of consumption and  z R) ( ϕ  is the JI of the worker of type z. Implicit 
differentiation determines the signs of the partial derivatives of the bid function with respect 
to R, U und z, where we get for  ] 1 , (α ∈ R ,  0 ) ( > − ′ = ′ θ m w u u  and  0 ) 1 )( ( > − = ′ p R g λ ϕ  
that:  0 / < ′ ′ − = u z R ϕ θ , if  0 > z ,  0 / 1 < ′ − = u U θ  and  0 / < ′ − = u z ϕ θ .  
The labor force consists of JS seekers and JS-neutral workers. JS seekers of type z are will-
ing to pay higher prices for a higher level of JS, as is shown by  0 < R θ . The second partial de-
rivative of the bid function with respect to R is  2 ) /( ) ( u u u z R RR ′ ′ ′ ′ + ′ ′ ′ − = θ ϕ ϕ θ . Thus, the bid 
function is strictly concave in R, if JI is (weakly) convex, such that  0 ) ( ≥ ′ ′ R ϕ . If, for example, 
the  demand  shocks  are  uniformly  distributed,  then  0 = ′ g   and  thus  0 ) ( = ′ ′ R ϕ ,  such  that 
0 ) /( 2 < ′ ′ ′ ′ − = u u z R RR θ ϕ θ . A strictly concave bid function implies a diminishing willingness 
of the JS seekers of type z to pay for additional JS.  
The bid wage  ) , ; ( z U R w , which is the minimum wage demanded by workers of type z and 
fixed utility level U for a labor contract with JI  z R) ( ϕ , is  ) , ; ( ) , ; ( z U R w z U R w m θ − = . The 
bid wage function is strictly increasing with respect to the reservation productivity R, the util- 
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ity index U and the expected scar z, as the partial derivatives with respect to R, U and z show: 
0 > − = R R w θ ,  0 > − = U U w θ  and  0 > − = z z w θ . To accept an infinitesimally higher JI, the 
JS seekers of type z will ask for a compensation of at least  0 ) , ; ( > z U R wR . If JI is convex, 
such that  0 ) ( ≥ ′ ′ R ϕ , the bid wage function will be strictly convex, as  0 > − = RR RR w θ . The 
convexity of  ) , ; ( z U R w  implies that the compensation for JI demanded by a JS seeker of type 
z is strictly increasing with the amount of JI. Figure 1 shows strictly convex bid wage curves 
for JS seekers of type  1 z  and  2 z . 
) (R P  is the minimum price workers must pay for job characteristic R in the market, while 
) , ; ( z U R θ  is the maximum price workers of type z are willing to pay for R at given utility 
level U. Therefore, when utility is maximized, the hedonic price must equal the bid price: 
) ), ( ); ( ( )) ( ( z z U z R z R P θ = , where  ) (z U  and  ) (z R  are the maximal utility and the optimal 
reservation productivity of the worker type z, respectively. Moreover, when utility is maxi-
mized, the bid wage workers of type z ask for when concluding a labor contract with reserva-
tion productivity  ) (z R  and the maximal wage paid in the market for that contract must fulfill 
)) ( ( ) ), ( ); ( ( z R w z z U z R w =  and  )) ( ( ) ), ( ); ( ( z R w z z U z R wR ′ = . The second condition says that 
when utility is maximized, the compensation demanded by workers of type z for a marginal 
increase in JI equals the compensation offered in the market.  
Offer functions. The offer function  ) ; ( J R φ  represents the minimum price firms are willing 
to accept for reservation productivity R at a fixed expected profit of J. Given equation (3), the 
offer function is determined by the iso-profit condition  ] ) ( [ ) ( S m I R G w R Y J λ φ − − − = . Re-
arranging  terms  yields:  ] ) ( ) ( [ ) ; ( S m I R G R Y w J J R λ φ + − + = .  The  offer  price  function  is 
strictly decreasing in R, as follows from the sign of the derivative of  ) ; ( J R φ  with respect to 
) , [ m R R α ∈ ,  0 ) ( ) ( ) ( < = R h R g R R λ φ , and reaches a minimum at  m R , because  0 ) ( = m R h , so 
that the FOC for a minimum point  0 ) ( = m R R φ  is satisfied. That  m R  is indeed a minimum 
point follows then from  0 ) ( > R R φ  for  ] 1 , ( m R R∈ . 
The following discussion centers on the long-run equilibrium of the hedonic market. The 
reason is that unlike in the standard hedonic models, the JS-model focuses on sorting by 
worker characteristics, whereas the firms adapt their contract terms frictionless to the exoge-
nous distribution of JS preferences.  
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In  the  long-run  equilibrium  0 = J ,  and  we  can  write  the  offer  function  as 
] ) ( ) ( [ ) ( S m I R G R Y w R λ φ + − = .  ) ( m R φ , the minimum of the offer function, is the lowest of-
fer  price  for  JS  in  the  hedonic  market.  Hence,  without  loss  of  generality,  we  can  set 
0 ) ( = m R φ . The competitive wage  m w  then takes on the value  S m m m I R G R Y w ) ( ) ( λ + =  in 
the long-run equilibrium. If we plug  m w  into the offer function, we find that the offer price 
for  ] , [ m R R α ∈  equals the labor-hoarding costs of a firm that commits itself to a labor con-
tract  with  reservation  productivity  R,  so that  ) ( ) ( R H R = φ  for all  ] , [ m R R α ∈ . Thus, the 
competitive offer prices cover the labor-hoarding costs of the JS suppliers. 
Given that  ) (R P  is the maximum price for job characteristic R that firms will receive in the 
market, profit maximum must satisfy  ) ( ) ( R P R = φ , which implies the strictly decreasing he-
donic price function for the job characteristic R 
  ] ) ( ) ( [ ) ( S m I R G R Y w R P λ + − = . 
The wage offer function is given by  ) ( ) ( R w R w m φ − = .  ) (R w  is the maximum (net) wage 
that firms are willing to pay for a labor contract with reservation productivity R at an expected 
profit  0 = J .  The  wage  offer  function  is  strictly  increasing  on  the  interval  ) , [ m R α ,  as 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( > − = ′ R h R g R w λ  shows, and reaches a maximum at  m R , where the necessary condi-
tion  0 ) ( = ′ m R w   holds.  The  second  derivative  of  the  offer  function  with  respect  to  R  is 
] ) ( ) ( ) ( [ ) ( y R g R h R g R w + ′ − = ′ ′ λ , so that the sufficient condition for a maximum of  ) (R w  at 
m R   is  satisfied,  as  0 ) ( ) ( < − = ′ ′ y R g R w m m λ ,  since  0 ) ( = m R h .  Uniformly  distributed  de-
mand  shocks  suffice  for  the  strict  concavity  of  the  wage  offer  function,  because 
0 ) ( ) ( < − = ′ ′ y R g R w λ , when 0 = ′ g . 
Since  ) (R w  is the minimum (net) wage firms must pay for a labor contract with reservation 
productivity R and JI  ) (R ϕ , profit maximization requires that  ) ( ) ( R w R w = , so that we obtain 
the wage function 
(4)  S I R G R Y R w ) ( ) ( ) ( λ + =  
As  is  shown  in  Fig.  1,  the  offer  curve  is  strictly  increasing  on  ) , [ m R α ,  = ′ ) (R w  
0 ) ( ) ( > − R h R g λ , and reaches its maximum at productivity  m R , where  0 ) ( = m R h . Thus, the 
highest wage is earned by those workers, who conclude a SPC with the reservation productiv- 
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ity  m R , for which  m m w R w = ) (  and  0 ) ( = m R P . The lowest wage,  ) ( ) ( α α α Y w w = ≡ , is 
paid to workers that conclude a GEC with the reservation productivity  α = R . Moreover, the 
offer curve is strictly concave on  ] 1 , [α , see Fig. 1, if the demand shocks are uniformly distrib-
uted. 
 









) ( 2 z w
) ( 1 z w
0 1 2 > > z z
) ( 2 z C
) ( 1 z C
 
Fig. 1: Severance Pay Contracts of workers  1 z  and  2 z  
 
Now we can answer the question how the optimal wage and reservation productivity  ) (z w  
and  ) (z R  depend on z. At the utility maximum  ) (z U , the marginal bid wage required by 
workers of type z at given utility  ) (z U  for a small increase of the reservation productivity 
equals the marginal wage offered in the market, i.e.  )) ( ( ) ), ( ); ( ( z R w z z U z R wR ′ = . Inserting 
the derivatives on both sides of the equation yields the FOC for the utility maximum for type z 










We call a risk efficient labor contract for type z that satisfies equations (4) and (5) an effi-
cient or first-best contract. The relationship between the provisions of an efficient labor con-
tract  )] ( ), ( [ ) ( z R z w z C =  and the expected scar  0 ≥ z  follows from equations (4) and (5), 
where we write  ) (z w  instead of  )) ( ( z R w  for the optimal wage.  
 
LEMMA 3. The reservation productivity  ] , ( ) ( m R z R α ∈ , the wage  ) (z w  and hence the sev-
erance pay  ) (z A  of the efficient contract  ) (z C  of worker type  0 ≥ z , are strictly decreasing 
1 C  functions of z. Thus, the equilibrium of the contract market is characterized by wage dis-
persion, which reflects worker sorting by the expected scar of unemployment z. The terms of  
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the efficient SPC of the JS-neutral worker are in particular determined by  m R R = ) 0 (  and 
m w w = ) 0 ( . 
 
Marginal worker type. Some JS seekers prefer the risk-free GEC that eliminates not only 
the  income  risk,  but  also  the  scarring  risk  of  unemployment.  The  wage  of  the  GEC  is 
) ( ) ( α α α Y w w = ≡ , and the probability of termination is  0 ) ( = α λG . Thus, the JI, when pro-
tected by the GEC, is  0 ) ( = z α ϕ . We will characterize next the marginal worker type 
1 α z , 
who is indifferent between the GEC and the type-specific SPC. 
 
PROPOSITION 1. The z-value of the marginal worker type, 












α α . 
 
All workers with a scar that exceeds 
1 α z  prefer the JS guarantee of the GEC, whereas all 
others prefer to trade JS for a higher wage and conclude a type-specific SPC with a positive 
exposure  to  JI.  The  efficient  exposure  to  JI  of  a  worker  of  type  ) , 0 (
1 α z z∈   is  given  by 
z z R z JI )) ( ( ) ( ϕ = .  Obviously,  0 ) ( ) 0 ( = = z JI JI   for  all 
1 α z z ≥ ,  such  that  the  JI  function 
) (z JI  is initially strictly increasing on the open interval  ) , 0 (
1 α z , reaches a global interior 
maximum and strictly decreases thereafter. Hence, the relationship between  ) (z JI  and the 
perceived probability of termination  )) ( ( z R G λ  is hump-shaped.  
Workers with an expected scar 
1 α z z >  are willing to accept a wage  ) (z w  that is strictly 
lower than the GEC wage  α w . The respective bid wage follows from (6) by replacing 
1 α z  
with  z  and  the  GEC  wage  α w   with  ) (z w .  Implicit  differentiation  implies  that 
0 ) ( / ) 1 ( ) ( < ′ ′ − − = ′ u h p z w α , where  0 ) ( > ′ ′ u h α . Given that  α w z w < ) ( , firms could exploit 
the vulnerable JS seekers by setting a wage w for which  α w w z w < ≤ ) ( . As  w z w ≤ ) ( , work-
ers are willing to accept the offered contract, unless they meet competing suppliers of JS guar-
antees with higher wages. Because  α w w < , firms would reap a profit  0 ) , ( ) , ( = > α α α w J w J  
despite the labor hoarding costs of the JS guarantee. However, in the long run, market entry 
and competition would drive the rent  w w − α  down to zero.   
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5  Contract and Spot Market Jobs 
The workers have the choice between the contract market and a spot market job in stage 0. 
Their decision depends on whether the spot market option is also available after being dis-
missed in stage 1. If the option can be exercised only in stage 0, a part of the labor force will 
immediately opt for the spot market and refuse all contract jobs. However, if the spot market 
is accessible on all stages, the entire labor force prefers a contract to a spot market job, as we 
will show next. 
Assume that the spot market option is available only in stage 0, so that the dismissed work-
ers become irrevocably unemployed and suffer the scar of unemployment. In that case, the JS-
neutral workers will strictly prefer to search for a spot market job, despite the uninsurable in-
come risk, if the following two conditions are fulfilled. First, the spot market wage v must ex-
ceed the contract wage 0 w , where  ] , [ 0 0 0 R w C =  is the efficient labor contract for a JS-neutral 
worker, if unemployment is the inescapable consequence of a dismissal. In analogy to wage 
equation  (4),  the  wage  0 w   is  determined  by  b R G R Y w ) ( ) ( 0 0 0 λ + = .  Given  the  fact  that 
y w < 0 , spot market wages v exist, for which  y v w ≤ < 0 . The respective reservation produc-
tivity  0 R   follows  from  the  continuation  rent  b yx x h − = ) ( ˆ   with  0 ) ( ˆ
0 = R h .  Obviously 
m R R < 0 , such that  m w w < 0 . Second, the probability p of finding a spot market job must sat-
isfy  
 
) ( ) (
) ( ) ( 0
0 b u v u




≡ > . 
If both conditions are strictly satisfied, a continuum of z types will decline to sign a labor 
contract and will instead search for a spot market job (see Proposition 2). In equilibrium, a 
part of the active labor force is employed in the spot market, whereas the rest, possibly of 
measure zero, prefers to work under a labor contract, as a contract provides insurance against 
the wage risk and protection from the scar of unemployment. 
If the spot market option is also available in stage 1 after separation, the entire labor force, 
including  the  JS-neutral  workers,  will  sign  a  labor  contract.  To prove this and the above 
proposition, let  ) (z U  denote the expected utility of z, if z concludes the efficient contract 
) (z C  and remember that  = ) (z V ] ) ( )[ 1 ( ) ( z b u p v pu − − +  is the ex ante expected utility of a 
spot market job.  
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PROPOSITION 2. (i) If the spot market option is available only in stage 0 and if  0 w v >  and 
0 p p > , then the JS-neutral workers will strictly prefer to look for a spot market job, i.e. 
) 0 ( ) 0 ( U V > . (ii) However, if the spot market option is also available after separation, then 
) ( ) ( z V z U > , for all worker types  0 ≥ z , 
 
In Jahn and Wagner (2005), we present the comparative static results for the JS-model and 
address the questions whether the ex ante agreed upon termination clauses of a SPC and the 
GEC are ex post efficient and whether re-contracting can improve efficiency, when the firm 
observes an alternative use for its job endowment at stage 1.  
IV  One-sided Private Information 
If the demand for the output of a job is observed by the firm, but not by the worker, the termi-
nation decision is non-contractible and the firms dismiss the workers at will. The hedonic 
market for JS generates a system of state contingent hedonic prices for JS. The number of 
prices  depends  on  the  coarseness  of  the  worker’s  information  partition.  In  the  common-
knowledge equilibrium, each quantity of JS has a unique hedonic price, which compensates 
the employer for his labor-hoarding costs. In the equilibrium with one-sided private informa-
tion, employers terminate the workers at will and incur no private labor-hoarding costs. In-
stead,  the  prices  for  JS  serve  as  incentives  to  stimulate  the  employer  to  implement  the 
worker’s constrained optimal JS. For the sake of brevity, we skip the derivation of the system 
of  state  contingent  hedonic  prices  and  derive  the  risk  and  JS-allocation  of  the  private-
information equilibrium with the instruments of non-linear programming.  
We will first discuss the incentive-compatibility constraint, which a JS seeker must take 
into account in order to move his employer to implement the constrained optimal at-will rule. 
Next, we show that only the first-best contracts of the extreme z-types are incentive compati-
ble. Then we focus on the question how the JS seekers with first-best SPCs react to the one-
sided private information and the resulting employment at-will rule.  
We can distinguish between two information structures, depending on whether the private 
information relates to the demand shock per se or, more specifically, to the observability of 
the  demand  yx.  We  assume  that  a  worker  at  stage  1  has  sufficient  information  to  verify 
whether his job is in a recession, but that he cannot observe the specific demand state yx be-
fore production takes place. Given this information structure, a SPC  ] , , , [ B A w C ω =  has four 
components, the wages w and ω, which the worker is paid in the good state and in a recession, 
respectively, the severance pay A, and the SUB B.  
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The expected profit of a job with a contract C and the reservation productivity R is 
(7)  [ ] ] ) 1 ( )[ ( )) ( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) , ( B p A R G R G w R Y R C J − + + − − − − = ω λ λ , 
where  ) (R Y  is the ex ante expected revenue. In the shadow of the information asymmetry the 
firm  selects  the  profit  maximizing  reservation  productivity  R.  R  satisfies  the  FOC 
0 ) , ( = R C JR  if, and only if, the operating loss  yx − ω  equals the expected costs of a dis-
missal  + A B p) 1 ( − . Thus, the firm terminates the worker, if  R x < , where the threshold R of 
the  profit  maximizing  at-will  rule  follows  from  the  incentive  compatibility  constraint 
+ ≡ A R C IC ) , ( − − − ω ( ) 1 ( B p 0 ) = yR . Solving the equation for R, we get the reaction func-
tion of the firm  ) , ( A R ω . If the recession wage decreases or the severance pay increases, the 
firm will reduce R and the JI of the worker will decline, as the partial derivatives of the reac-
tion function reveal:  0 > ω R  and  0 < A R .  
The expected utility of a JS seeker of type z with contract C, whose employer picks the res-
ervation productivity R, is 
(8)  ) , , ( ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) , ( z B A V R G u R G w u R C U λ ω λ λ + − + − = . 
Taking into account the free entry condition, the private information SPC for a worker of 
type  0 ≥ z  corresponds to the solution of the constrained maximization problem 




   subject to    0 ) , ( ≥ R C J  and  0 ) , ( = R C IC . 
Grossman and Hart (1981, 1983) emphasize that the first-best SPC between a JS-neutral 
worker with  0 = z  and a risk-neutral firm is incentive compatible, even though the termina-
tion decision is not contractible. The authors thus model the consequences of the information 
asymmetry under the assumption that the firm is risk-averse. In the JS model, the incentive 
compatibility of the first-best contract follows at once from the JS-neutrality of the neoclassi-
cal workers.  
In contrast, a risk-neutral firm that employs a JS seeker has a strong incentive in a recession 
to announce a wrong output demand to terminate the job and to dismiss the worker. The rea-
son is that a first-best SPC not only shifts the income-risk to the risk-neutral firm, but also 
protects the worker from termination. However, protecting a JS-seeker with the first-best res-
ervation productivity  m R z R < ) (  against the scar of unemployment forces the firm to hoard 
his labor in all recession states x, for which  < ≤ x z R ) ( m R . Hence, if the demand is private in- 
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formation, the firm can save the labor hoarding costs  0 )) ( ( > z R H  and terminate the job at 
the profit maximizing  m R , for which  0 ) ( = m R H .  
 
LEMMA 4. The first-best SPC of a JS-seeker  ) , 0 (
1 α z z∈  is not incentive compatible, if the 
demand for the output of the job is observed by the firm, but not by the worker. 
 
) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , , , ( R C IC R C J R C U R C γ δ γ δ + + = L , the Lagrangian of the maximization prob-
lem (9), is a concave function of the provisions of the private information SPC and R. The 
FOC for an interior solution with  0 ≥ δ  and γ as the Lagrangian multipliers of the participa-
tion and the incentive constraint, respectively, are 
(10)  0 ] ) ( )[ 1 ( = − ′ − =
∂
∂




(11)  0 ] ) ( ))[ ( 1 ( = − − ′ − =
∂
∂





(12)  0 ] ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( )[ ( = + − + + ′ − + + ′ =
∂
∂




(13)  [ ] 0 ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 )( ( = − + − + + ′ − =
∂
∂





[ ]] 0 ) ( ) 1 (
] ) ( )[ 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) (
= + − − − +
+ − + + − − + − − =
∂
∂
y yR B p A






Inspection of the FOC (10) - (14) yields the following results for the private information 
SPC. 
 
LEMMA 5. (i) The multiplier δ is equal to the marginal utility of consumption in the good 
state,  0 ) ( > = ′ δ w u . (ii) The multiplier γ, which reflects the difference between the marginal 
utility of consumption in the bad and in the good state,  = γ )] ( ) ( ))[ ( 1 ( w u u R G ′ − ′ − ω λ , is 
nonnegative,  0 ≥ γ . The contract with z specifies that the firm pays ω in a recession and w in 
the good state, where  0 > γ , and thus  ω > w  if and only if  0 > z . (iii) As  = + v A b B A + + , a 
second-best SPC fully shifts the income-risk of the dismissed worker to the firm. (iv) None-
theless, in contrast to the JS-neutral workers, JS seekers do not fully insure their income. 
Rather,  they  prefer  an  ex  post  replacement  rate  which  is  strictly  larger  than  one, 
= + v A ω > > + + w b B A . (v) Sorting of workers by the expected scar of unemployment in-
duces a strictly decreasing reservation productivity  ] , [ ) ( m R z R α ∈  with  m R R = ) 0 ( . 
 
The full insurance conditions (1) of the common knowledge model follow with  0 = γ  from 
the FOC (10) – (13). JS seekers, who sign a private information SPC, earn a risk-free re-
placement income in case of a dismissal. However, in order to contain the JI imposed by the  
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profit maximizing at-will rule, the JS seekers accept wage risk. Choosing the terms of the op-
timal SPC, they observe the following averaging rule derived from the FOC (10) – (13):  
(15)  )] ( ) 1 ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( b B A u p v A u p R G u R G w u + + ′ − + + ′ + ′ − = ′ ω . 
A JS seeker, who closes a SPC, will equalize the marginal utility of income in the good 
state with the expected marginal utility of his recession income. 
Job security. The prediction of the JS-model that a risk-averse JS-seeker in a recession ac-
cepts a wage cut, i.e.  w < ω , is confirmed by the literature on JI7. The reason for this two-
wage structure of a second-best SPC is the prevailing employment at will policy and not the 
demand recession per se. As the separation decision is not contractible, JS seekers use a low 
recession wage and a high severance pay to stimulate their employer to pick the preferred at-
will rule, as the following Lemma confirms. 
Let  ) (z C  be the private information SPC for type  0 ≥ z . The behavior of the severance pay 
and the recession wage of  ) (z C  as functions of z are characterized by: 
 
LEMMA 6. In contrast to the first-best,  ) (z A  is strictly increasing, whereas  ) (z ω  strictly de-
creases at least in a neighborhood of  0 = z .  
 
The marginal worker. The separation decision is not contractible, but there is one exception 
from the rule, which is the GEC. Because the distribution function G and its support are pub-
lic knowledge, the asymmetric information on the demand is of no importance for the terms of 
the  risk-free  GEC  = α C ] , [ α α w .  The  one-sided  private  information  raises  the  fraction  of 
workers that favors the GEC. To prove this proposition, we first characterize the marginal 
worker type 
2 α z , who is indifferent between the GEC and the type-specific second-best SPC. 
The marginal worker 
2 α z  would sign a SPC with wages  = w α ω w = . To induce the em-
ployer to choose the reservation productivity  α = R , the severance pay A and the SUB B must 
satisfy  + A ) (α ω h v − =  and  b v B − = . Given these terms of the type-specific SPC, the em-
ployer will indeed implement  α = R . Moreover, the participation constraint of the maximiza-
tion problem (9) holds as a strict equality. In view of  = γ 0 )] ( ) ( ))[ ( 1 ( = ′ − ′ − w u u R G ω λ  and 
Lemma 5 (iii), FOC (14) implies the following equation for the marginal worker type 
                                                 
7   Gregory and Jukes (2001), Nickell et al. (2002), Farber (2005).  
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(16) 
p













PROPOSITION 3. The fraction of workers, who conclude the risk-free GEC, is strictly larger 
in the second-best than in the first-best contract market equilibrium, i.e. 
1 2 0 α α z z < < , where 
1 α z  is given by equation (6).  
 
With the exception of the extreme z-types all JS seekers suffer a welfare loss in the private 
information equilibrium, even though some of them enjoy more JS than in the first-best equi-
librium. We denote the reservation productivities of type z in the first-best and the second-best 
as  ) ( 1 z R  and  ) ( 2 z R , respectively. In particular, the JS seekers  ) , [
1 2 α α z z z∈  will sign a SPC 
in the first -best and a GEC with reservation productivity  α = ) ( 2 z R  in the second-best equi-
librium. Comparing the JI, we have  0 ) ( ) ( 2 1 = > z z z z ϕ ϕ , where  ) 1 ))( ( ( ) ( p z R G z i i − = λ ϕ , 
2 , 1 = i . A more general comparison of the JI in the first and second-best equilibrium provides 
 
LEMMA 7. (i) The first-best contract of the JS-neutral workers is incentive compatible, so that 
m R R R = = ) 0 ( ) 0 ( 2 1 . (ii) Among the JS seekers with private information SPC, there is a type 
z ˆ  that enjoys the same JS in the first and second-best equilibrium:  ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 2 1 z R z R = , where 
) , 0 ( ˆ
2 α z z∈ . (iii) JS seekers of type  ) ˆ , 0 ( z z∈  face a higher JI in the second-best equilibrium, 
) ( ) ( 1 2 z R z R > , whereas JS seekers of type  ) , ˆ (
1 α z z z∈ , for whom  ) ( ) ( 1 2 z R z R <  holds, ex-
perience a lower JI than in the first-best equilibrium. 
 
Efficiency. For the extreme z-types  0 = z  and 
1 α z z ≥ , the risk and JS-allocation of the pri-
vate information equilibrium is efficient. However, the equilibrium allocation is inefficient for 
the JS seekers  ) , 0 (
1 α z z∈ . There are two sources for the inefficiency. First, as Lemma 5 indi-
cates, workers concluding a private information SPC are under-insured, as they bear income-
risk. Second, all worker types  ) , [
1 2 α α z z z∈  are over-insured. They conclude the GEC, al-
though their first-best alternative would be a SPC with a positive exposure to JI. To correct 
the market failure, a social planner, who is subject to the same information asymmetry as the 
workers, employs three instruments for each type  ) , 0 (
1 α z z∈ , one to smooth consumption, a 
second to induce efficient separations and a third to regulate the market entry of the jobs (see 
Jahn and Wagner 2005). 
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V  Two-sided Private Information 
This section deals with two-sided private information. Workers are unable to observe demand 
at stage 1, while firms cannot verify the re-employment status of a dismissed worker at stage 
2. Thus, neither termination nor SUB are contractible. 
The feasibility of a contract claim offering SUB depends on whether the former employer 
can observe the subsequent employment status of a dismissed worker. In view of the threat 
0 > z , firms can be sure that at least the JS seekers have a strong intrinsic motive to search for 
re-employment. However, as the result of the job search is unobservable, a released worker 
would report in any case that he could not find a new job and would insist on his claim to B. 
Thus, SUB are not contractible and a third-best SPC,  ] , , [ A w C ω = , includes a wage for the 
good state w, a wage for the recession states ω and the severance pay A. The terms of the con-
tract are determined by the solution to the maximization problem (9) with FOC (10) – (12) 
and (14), where we must set  0 = B  throughout. 
The non-contractibility of B has several consequences. First, workers closing a SPC face 
wage-replacement risk. The wage-replacement risk is the result of the uncertain replacement 
income  I A
~
+ ,  where  the  random  variable  I
~
  is  either  equal  to  v  or  to  b,  depending  on 
whether a dismissed worker finds a spot market job or becomes unemployed. Second, in the 
third-best situation the GEC is the only labor contract that fully insures a worker against the 
income risk. It is thus possible to observe both JS seekers and JS-neutral workers closing a 
GEC. One group wants a secure job, the other wishes to insure their income. Third, the sign of 
the Lagrangian multiplier γ associated with the incentive compatibility constraint is ambigu-
ous. It is intuitively appealing to expect that the wage of a constrained optimal SPC for the 
good state w is higher than the wage for the recession states ω, such that  0 ≥ γ . However, if B 
is un-contractible, the case that  0 < γ  and thus  w > ω  cannot be excluded. Below, we first in-
troduce the type-specific risk premium for the wage-replacement risk. We will then character-
ize the marginal worker type, who is indifferent between the GEC and the type-specific third-
best SPC. Next, we present general results for the SPC and discuss thereafter the issue of the 
sign of γ, where we will supply the utility function u with more structure and assume that 
workers are prudent.  
Risk Premium. In the following, 
2 2 2 ) )( 1 ( ) ( S S S I b p I v p − − + − = σ  is the variance of the 
risk  I
~
;  ) (c a  is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion with  ) ( / ) ( ) ( c u c u c a ′ ′ ′ − = ; 
and  )
~
), ( ( I z A z π π =  is the risk premium associated with wage- replacement risk  I
~
 for a  
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worker of type z, who is dismissed with severance pay  ) (z A . The worker is indifferent be-
tween receiving the risky replacement income I
~
 and receiving the certain payment  z S I π − : 
  ) ) ( ( ) 1 ( ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( b z A u p v z A pu I z A u z S + − + + = − + π . 
Because  )
~
, ) ( ( )
~
), ( ( S S I I I z A I z A − + = π π , we can approximate  z π  for small risks with 




S S z I z A a + ≅ σ π . As we will show below, it depends 
on the risk premium of the marginal worker type 
3 α π , whether the entire labor force will 
close a GEC.  
Marginal Worker. If workers sign a SPC, the contract terms are determined by the FOC of 
the maximization problem (9). If no interior solution exists, because all workers prefer the 
risk-free  GEC  to  a  SPC,  we  set  the  type  of  the  marginal  worker, 
3 α z ,  equal  to  zero.  If 
0
3 > α z , the marginal worker type is indifferent between the GEC and the type-specific SPC. 
If 
3 α z  signs a SPC, the agreed upon severance pay is  0 ) (
3 > − = α α α y w z A , while the wages 
of the marginal SPC are given by  α ω w w = = , and  α = R  is the incentive compatible reser-
vation productivity. Thus, the expected replacement income of the marginal worker type is 
) ( ) (
3 α α α h w I z A S − = + . 
The following proposition generalizes the Wage-Bill Argument of Akerlof and Miyazaki 
(1980). In the first-best and the second-best situation,  0 ) ( ≥ α h  is necessary and sufficient to 
ensure that the labor market equilibrium is a “fixed-wage-cum-full-employment equilibrium,” 
as is shown by equations (6) and (16) for the marginal worker types. The generalization of the 
Wage-Bill Argument proves that the labor market equilibrium will be a “fixed-wage-cum-full-
employment equilibrium”, if  ) (
3 α πα h − ≥ , where 
3 α π  is the risk premium associated with 
the wage-replacement risk for a marginal worker, who would be terminated with severance 
pay  ) (
3 α z A . 
 
PROPOSITION  4.  If  neither  the  SUB  nor  the  separation  decision  are  contractible,  then 
1 2 3 0 α α α z z z < < ≤ , where  α y b ≥  is sufficient for  0
3 > α z . Moreover,  0
3 > α z  holds if, and 
only if,  ) (
3 α πα h − < , where the Arrow-Pratt Approximation of the risk premium for the mar-
ginal worker type depends only on exogenous parameters:  )) ( ( 2
2
1
3 α σ π α α h w a S − ≅ . 
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A job that produces and delivers the output yα forgoes the expected replacement income  S I  
and pays for the decision with the social net loss  0 ) ( > − α h . If the social net loss is less than 
the risk premium, which the marginal worker type is prepared to pay to get rid of the wage-
replacement risk, such that  ) (
3 α πα h − ≥ , then  0
3 = α z  and the entire labor force, including 
the JS-neutral workers, will close the GEC.  
If  0
3 > α z , then all types  ) , 0 [
3 α z z∈  strictly prefer a private information SPC to the GEC, 
even though they have to cope with both kinds of risk. Let C be a third-best SPC, and let R be 
the incentive compatible reservation productivity associated with C. The FOC (10) – (12) and 
(14) yield the following general results for the terms of C and R. 
 
LEMMA 8. (i) The multiplier δ is equal to the marginal utility of consumption in the good 
state,  0 ) ( > = ′ δ w u . (ii) The ex post replacement rate of a dismissed worker who found a new 
job is strictly larger than one,  > + v A } , { max ω w . (iii) Worker sorting by the expected scar of 
unemployment  induces  a  strictly  decreasing  incentive  compatible  reservation  productivity 
) (z R .  
 
As in the second-best situation, the JS seekers  ) , 0 (
3 α z z∈  will sign a SPC with an ex post 
replacement rate, for which  > + v A } , { max ω w . However, in contrast to the one-sided private 
information case, even the JS-neutral workers agree upon an ex post replacement rate greater 
than one in view of the wage-replacement risk.  
Without insurance against the risk  I
~
, the FOC provide no information on the properties of 
the third-best reservation productivities  ) (z R . Lemma 8 (iii) informs us only about the fact 
that  ] 1 , [ ) ( α ∈ z R  is strictly decreasing as a consequence of worker sorting. We will now intro-
duce stronger assumptions on the utility function u and will show first that risk-averse and 
prudent workers select third-best SPCs, which induce their employers to choose a termination 
policy for which  ) , [ ) ( m R z R α ∈ .  
Prudence. We assume that u is a 
3 C  function, which exhibits absolute prudence. In the 
context of intertemporal expected utility maximization, the precautionary saving of an inves-
tor depends on his precautionary saving motive, which can be measured by the coefficient of 
absolute prudence  ) (c P  for which,  = ) (c P ) ( / ) ( c u c u ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ − , where u ′ ′ ′  is the third derivative of u. 
The precautionary motive implies  0 ) ( > c P  or, in view of the concavity of u,  0 ) ( > ′ ′ ′ c u . More-
over, a worker who is risk-averse can be either prudent or imprudent, i.e. the absolute risk- 
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aversion  0 > a  is compatible with either  0 ≥ P  or  0 < P . However, if one believes that de-
creasing absolute risk-aversion is a valid assumption, then one has to accept also that the 
workers  exhibit  absolute  prudence.  This  proposition  follows  from  the  identity 
− = ) ( ) ( c a c P ) ( / ) ( c a c a′ , which represents the relationship between absolute prudence and 
absolute risk-aversion. Obviously, the absolute risk-aversion of u is non-increasing if and only 
if  ) ( ) ( c a c P ≥  (Kimball 1990, Kimball and Weil 2003). 
Assume  0
3 > α z , and let workers be prudent, such that  0 ) ( ≥ c P . The following lemma 
summarizes the more specific results about the contract terms of prudent workers of type 
) , 0 [
3 α z z∈  and the termination policy of their employers. 
 
LEMMA 9. (i) JS-neutral and prudent workers conclude a SPC, which stimulates their em-
ployers to choose the reservation productivity  m R R < ) 0 ( . (ii) Workers are prudent and thus 
close  a  contract  with  a  precautionary  replacement  payment  − + = ] ) ( [ ) ( S I z A z s  
)} ( ), ( { max z z w ω , for which  )) ( ( ) ( 0 z R h z s − ≤ < .  
 
Contract wages. If the ex post wage-replacement of an unemployed JS seeker exceeds his 
recession wage, such that  ω ≥ +b A , then  ω > w  holds. Assume to the contrary, that  ω ≤ w  
would  be  true.  Then  Lemma  8  (ii)  and  (A1)  would  imply  contract  provisions 
w b A v A ≥ ≥ + > + ω ,  which  violate  the  averaging  rule  (15).  Thus,  one  reason  why  a  JS 
seeker  would  sign  a  SPC  with  w > ω   are  low  unemployment  benefits  b.  The  wage-
replacement risk is uninsurable, but the high recession wage would contain the income risk in 
this case and would assure that the averaging rule (15) holds. Therefore, the question arises 
whether there exists a lower bound b , such that  b b ≥  implies  ) ( ) ( z z w ω ≥  for  ) , 0 [
3 α z z∈ ?  
If  α y b ≥  and if for the job finding rate of the spot market  2 / 1 > p , then, as we will argue 
below, there exists a worker type  ) , 0 [
3 α ρ z z ∈ , such that all JS seekers  ) , [
3 α ρ z z z∈  will 
close a third-best SPC with contract wages  ) ( ) ( z z w ω > .  
For a given SPC  ] , , [ A w C ω =  and the incentive compatible reservation productivity R, 
FOC (11) – (12) yield the following equation for the Lagrangian multiplier γ 
  )] ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ))[ ( 1 )( ( b A u p v A u p u R G R G + ′ − − + ′ − ′ − = ω λ γ . 
The expression in square brackets measures the welfare gain from a reallocation of a unit of 
the wage-replacement income  I A
~
+  to the recession income ω. The reallocation yields a wel-
fare gain, if and only if,  0 > γ . Now solve the incentive compatibility constraint with respect  
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to the recession wage  yR A+ = ω  and plug the result into the above equation for γ. Further-
more, replace the risk I
~
 by the actuarially neutral risk  S I I −
~
 to get 
)] ( ) 1 ( ) ( )) ( ( ))[ ( 1 )( ( S S S S S I b I A u p I v I A u p R h I A u R G R G − + + ′ − − − + + ′ − + + ′ − = λ γ . 
Next, choose a quadratic approximation of the marginal utility terms around the expected 
wage-replacement income  S I A+  to obtain after rearranging terms (see App. A4): 
(17)  ( ) ] 2 )[ ( ) ( ) ( )) ( 1 )( ( ˆ 2 2
2
1
S R S S I A P R h I A u R G R G σ σ λ γ γ − + + − + ′ ′ − − ≡ ≅ . 
Workers  are  prudent,  so  that  0 ) ( ≥ + S I A P .  Moreover,  the  continuation  rent  is  strictly 
negative  for  all  ] , 0 [
3 α z z∈ ,  as  results  from  Lemma  8  (iii)  and  Lemma  9  (i),  such  that 
0 ) ( > − R h . Thus,  0 2 ) (
2 2 ≥ − ≡ S R R T σ σ  is sufficient for  0 ˆ > γ . However, the sign of  ) (R T  is 
ambiguous, where 
2
S σ  is the variance and  2
R σ  is the dispersion of the risk  I
~
 around the res-
ervation demand yR:  2 2 2 ) )( 1 ( ) ( yR b p yR v p R − − + − = σ . Thus, we will investigate the sign 
of  ) (R T  next. 
The following lemma proves that  ) (R T  is a strictly decreasing function which has a zero at 
productivity ρ,  0 ) ( = ρ T , where the output yρ is one standard deviation  S σ  smaller than the 
output  m yR , such that  S S S m I yR y σ σ ρ − = − ≡ , because  S m I yR = . Given that  ) (R T  is 
strictly decreasing, the inequality  0 ) ( ≥ R T , which is sufficient for  0 ˆ > γ , is satisfied if and 
only if  ρ ≤ R . The final part of the following lemma proves that  α y b ≥  and  2 / 1 > p  are suf-
ficient for  ) , ( m R α ρ ∈ .  
 
LEMMA 10. (i)  2
R σ  is a strictly decreasing function of  ) , [ m R R α ∈  with a boundary maximum 
at α and a minimum at  m R , where  2 2
S Rm σ σ = , such that  0 ) (
2 < − = S m R T σ . (ii) Productivity ρ 
is  a  zero  of  ) (R T ,  such  that  0 ) ( ≥ R T   for  all  ρ ≤ R .  (iii)  Because  − − + = p b v b y )[ ( ρ  
] ) 1 ( p p − , taking into account assumption (A1)  2 / 1 ≥ p  is sufficient for  0 ≥ ≥ b yρ . (iv) If 
α y b ≥  and  2 / 1 > p , then  ) , ( m R α ρ ∈ . 
 
Regarding the sign of the Lagrangian multiplier γ, approximation (17) provides the follow-
ing four cases, where we assume for the last two cases that  ) , ( m R α ρ ∈ .  
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First, if for the coefficient of absolute prudence  0 = P , the associated utility function u is 
quadratic. Considering approximation (17) or, in the quadratic case, the FOC, we can con-
clude from  0 = P  that the Lagrangian multiplier γ is uniformly positive for all third-best SPC. 
Thus,  it  follows  in  view  of  Lemma  9  (ii)  that  ) ( ) ( ) ( z z w I z A S ω > > +   holds  for  all 
) , 0 [
3 α z z∈ . Second, the Lagrangian multiplier is also positive, if the wage-replacement risk is 
small and  0
2 → S σ . 
Third, if  0 > P  and  ρ ≤ ) 0 ( R , then  0 )) ( ( ≥ z R T  for all worker types  ) , 0 [
3 α z z∈ , which 
implies in view of (17) that  ) ( ) ( ) ( z z w I z A S ω > > + . 
Fourth, if  ) 0 ( R < ρ , then the Lagrangian multiplier γ is positive for worker types with a 
strong demand for JS and  ] , ( ) ( ρ α ∈ z R . However, a negative sign of γ cannot be precluded a 
priori  for  the  SPCs  of  the  worker  types  ) , 0 [ ρ z z∈   with  reservation  productivity 
)] 0 ( , ( ) ( R z R ρ ∈ .  
VI  Summary 
Since the 90s, complaints about rising job insecurity (JI) due to globalization and the diffusion 
of ICT are widespread. One reason that the hypothesis of a significant upward trend in JI has 
been tested without conclusive results may be the lack of an economic theory of job security 
(JS) and the impact JS preferences and labor-hoarding costs exert on the choice of a work-
place.  
Our paper develops a model of a hedonic market for JS, where risk-neutral firms meet risk-
averse workers with heterogeneous JS preferences. Revealed JS preferences represent the scar 
of unemployment that a worker expects in the case of a dismissal. Worker sorting by JS pref-
erences results in an offer curve of the hedonic market for JS that spans a continuum of sever-
ance pay contracts (SPC) and the guaranteed employment contract (GEC). In the equilibrium 
of the labor market, the bid prices workers are willing to pay for the contracted JS equal the 
offer prices at which their employers are ready to supply the preferred termination policy. Of-
fer prices compensate for the labor-hoarding costs firms incur when implementing a termina-
tion rule that deviates from the profit maximizing employment at will. As the hedonic price of 
JS is strictly increasing, workers with weak JS preferences are willing to trade JS for higher 
wages. Consequently, the JS model allows for an equilibrium rate of unemployment, which is 
strictly  larger  than  zero,  in  contrast  to  the  Wage-Bill  Argument  of  Akerlof  and  Miyazaki  
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(1980),  where  the  total  labor  force  consists  of  productively  homogeneous  and  JS-neutral 
workers concluding a labor contract with an unconditional JS guarantee. 
We use a composite measure of JI which encompasses four dimensions: the chance that a 
job is hit by an adverse demand shock and the worker is terminated, combined with the prob-
ability that the dismissed worker cannot find a new job and becomes unemployed, weighted 
with the worker-specific welfare loss from the scar of unemployment. Ex ante the relation be-
tween the composite measure of JI and the perceived probability of a dismissal is hump-
shaped. This means for the evaluation of the JS question of the General Social Survey (GSS) - 
Thinking about the next 12 months, how likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or 
be laid off – very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely? – that a high frequency 
of workers who answer very likely or fairly likely provides no proof of a high individual or 
aggregate JI.  
If the demand for the output of a job is observed by the firm, but not by the worker, JS is 
not contractible and the firms will terminate the workers at will. Although JS is not contracti-
ble, there is one exception that proves the rule, which is the GEC. The GEC and likewise all 
first best contracts closed by workers with extreme JS preferences are incentive compatible 
under one-sided private information on the demand. The other risk-avers workers react to the 
asymmetric information either by choosing the GEC or by trading wage risk for a higher JS. In 
spite of the fact that firms terminate workers at will, worker sorting by JS preferences and, 
hence, a strictly positive unemployment rate characterize the one-sided private information 
equilibrium.  
If workers cannot verify demand and firms are unable to control the re-employment status 
of a dismissed worker, neither JS nor SUB are contractible. Without the option to claim SUB, 
dismissed workers face wage-replacement risk. Therefore, with two-sided private information, 
even JS-neutral workers pay the price for a JS guarantee, if their risk premium associated with 
the wage-replacement risk is larger than the social net loss from production. Thus, in contrast 
to the common knowledge and the one-sided private information case, the two-sided private 
information equilibrium can indeed happen to be a “fixed-wage-cum-full-employment equilib-
rium”.  
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Appendix 
A1 Proof of Lemma 2 
Ad (i): Assume that the job of z is hit by a shock  ] 1 , [α ∈ x . If the efficient contract C of z 
stipulates production, the utility of z is  ) (w u . If  0 ) ( = x r , the job is closed down and the ex-
pected utility of z at stage 1 is  z p w u ) 1 ( ) ( − −  with regard to the full insurance conditions. 
Therefore, z prefers production to separation for all  ] 1 , [α ∈ x , his preference being strict, if 
0 > z . Ad (ii): If  1 ) ( = x r  and C stipulates production, the profit of the firm is  w yx − . If 
0 ) ( = x r  and the job is closed down, the profit is  w IS − , where we take into account the in-
surance equations (1). Therefore, in case of a shock  ] 1 , [α ∈ x , the firm prefers production  
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whenever  w I w yx S − ≥ − ,  or  if  and  only  if  0 ) ( ≥ − ≡ S I yx x h ,  which  is  equivalent  to 
m R x ≥ . Ad (iii): From (i) and (ii), it follows that  1 ) ( = ⇒ ≥ x r R x m . Ad (iv): If the reserva-
tion productivity for worker type z would not be unique, we could find  1 R  and  2 R  with 
α > > ≥ 2 1 R R Rm ,  = ) ( 1 R r 1 ) ( 2 = R r  and  > > x R1 0 ) ( 2 = ⇒ x r R  such that 
 
] ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( [ ) ( ) )( 1 (
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) )( 1 (






∫ + ∫ + − + − − =
∫ + − + − − =






x dG x h x r x dG x h x r w I w y
x dG x h x r w I w y








Taking into account  1 ) ( 2 = R r ,  0 ) ( 2 < R h , and  0 ) ( 2 > R g , differentiating  ) (C J  with respect 
to  2 R  yields  0 ) ( ) ( ) ( / ) ( 2 2 2 2 < = ∂ ∂ R g R h R r R C J λ , contradicting the assumption that C is ef-
ficient, because  0 / ) ( 2 < ∂ ∂ R C J  implies that a reduction of  α > 2 R  would not only increase 
the worker’s utility, but also the profit of the firm. Q.E.D. 
A2 Proof of Lemma 3 and Proposition 1 and 2 
Proof of Lemma 3. From the FOC (5), we obtain the reservation productivity R as an implicit 
function K of z, where  − + ≡ 1 ( ) ( ) , ( z R h z R K 0 )) ( ( / ) = ′ R w u p . The partial derivatives of K 
with  respect  to  z  and  ) , [ m R R α ∈ ,  taking  into  account  the  wage  function  (4),  are: 
0 / ) 1 ( > ′ − = u p Kz   and  − = y KR 0 ) / ) ( )( ) /( ) 1 ( ( 2 > ′ ′ ′ − dR R dw u u p z ,  where 
0 ) ( ) ( / ) ( > − = R h R g dR R dw λ . Therefore, we may use the Implicit Function Theorem, which 
yields the existence of  ) (z R  and  0 / / < − = R z K K dz dR . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 1. The z-value of the marginal worker type is derived by inserting  α = R  
in the function  ) , ( z R K  defined above and solving for z.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Ad (i): (A1) and (A2) state that  0 ) ( ) ( / ) ( > − = b u v u dp z dV  for all z. 
The  substitution  of  0 p   in  ) 0 ( V   yields  ) ( ) 0 ( 0 w u V = .  Thus,  it  follows  for  0 p p >   that 
) ( ) ( ) 0 ( 0 0 w u C U V = > . Ad (ii): Worker  0 ≥ z  is strictly better off with a contract market job 
if  and  only  if  ) ( ] ) ( )[ 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ))( ( ( )) ( ( ) ( z V z b u p v pu z p z R G z w u z U ≡ − − + > − − ≡ λ ,  where  
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] , [ ) ( m R z R α ∈ . Assume to the contrary that  ) ( ) ( z V z U ≤ . In view of the risk-aversion of u, 
the  working  hypothesis  implies  + < − − ≤ ) ( ( ) 1 )))( ( ( 1 ( 0 z w u z p z R G λ )) ( ( )) ( z w u z d − ,  with 
0 ) ( ) ( > − = z w I z d S   from  the  monotonicity  of  u,  thus  < − − ≤ z p z R G ) 1 )))( ( ( 1 ( 0 λ  
)) ( ( ) ( z w u z d ′ .  The  contract  ) (z C   is  efficient,  therefore  = − z p) 1 ( )) ( ( )) ( ( z w u z R h ′ − ,  so 
) ( ))) ( ( 1 ))( ( ( z d z R G z R h < − − λ  such that  − < ) ( ) ( z yR z w )) ( ( )) ( ( z R G z R h λ , a contradiction 
to  − > ) ( ) ( z yR z w )) ( ( )) ( ( z R G z R h λ , which holds for all  0 ≥ z , as is shown next.  
By equation (4) and the definition of the continuation rent h, the strict inequality above is 
true if and only if  S S I R G yR R G I R G R Y ) ( )) ( 1 ( ) ( ) ( λ λ λ + − > + , where we suppress the func-
tional  notation  and  the  argument  z.  Inserting  )] ( ) 1 [( ) ( R y R Y λµ λ + − = ,  where 
= ) (R µ ∫
1 ) ( R x dG x , dividing through by y and rearranging terms yields the conclusion that the 
above inequality holds if and only if  − − − ≡ ))] ( 1 ( 1 [ ) ( R R µ λ ∆ 0 )) ( 1 ( > − R R G λ .  ) (R ∆  is a 
strictly decreasing 
2 C  function, with  0 ) ( > α ∆  and  0 ) 1 ( = ∆ , as will be proved next. 
First,  note  that  1 ) ( < = < µ α µ α ,  0 ) 1 ( = µ   and  1 < λ ,  thus  − = 1 [ ) (α ∆  
0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )] 1 ( > − > − − − = − − α µ µ λ α α µ λ   and  0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( = − − − = λ λ ∆ .  Moreover,  in 
view  of  ) ( ) ( R Rg R − = ′ µ ,  we  obtain  0 )) ( 1 ( ) ( < − − = ′ R G R λ ∆ .  Therefore  − > ) ( ) ( z yR z w  
)) ( ( )) ( ( z R G z R h λ  for all  0 ≥ z . Q.E.D. 
A3 Proof of Lemma 4 - 7 and Proposition 3. 
Proof  of  Lemma  4.  Under  symmetric  information,  worker  ) , 0 (
1 α z z∈   concludes  a  SPC 
= ) (z C )] ( ), ( [ z R z w  with  m R z R < < ) ( α . Using the full insurance conditions (1) and rearrang-
ing terms yields:  + ) (z A S I z w B p − = − ) ( ) 1 ( , which in turn implies  + ≡ ) ( )) ( ), ( ( z A z R z C IC  
− − B p) 1 ( 0 )) ( ( )] ( ) ( [ < = − z R h z yR z w . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof  of  Lemma  5.  Ad  (ii):  Assume  that  0 < γ .  Then,  the  FOC  (10)  –  (13)  imply 
< + + = + b B A v A ω < w ,  but  from  (14)  [ 0 ] ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( > − = − − − + y z p u v A u R g γ ω λ   thus 
> > + ω v A v A+ , a contradiction, so  0 ≥ γ . From  0 > γ ,  0 = z  and (10) – (13) we obtain 
ω > > + w v A , but (14) implies  v A+ > ω , so  0 > γ  implies  0 > z . Finally, let  0 = γ  and 
0 > z . Then, assuming  α > R , we obtain  ω = = + w v A  from (10) – (13), but (14) implies 
ω > + v A . Thus,  0 > γ , if  0 > z  and  α > R . Ad (iii): Follows from the FOC (12) and (13). 
Ad (iv): Follows from the FOC and from (ii). Ad (v): Below we prove that R is a strictly de- 
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creasing  function  of  z.  The  incentive  constraint  implies  = − − − + ) ( ) 1 ( yR B p A ω  
− − + ω ( ) ( v A 0 )) ( = R h , so  0 ) ( ≤ R h  since  ω ≥ + v A . Thus  ] , [ ) ( m R z R α ∈ . If  0 = z , we get 
0 = γ ,  considering  part  (ii)  of  the  lemma.  For  0 = γ ,  ω = + v A   and  thus 
= − − + )) ( ( ) ( R h v A ω 0 ) ( = R h , so  m R R = ) 0 ( .  
To prove that  ) (z R  is a strictly decreasing function of z, we develop the bordered  × + ) ( k n  
7 7 ) ( × = + k n   Hessian  matrix  for  the  Lagrangian  function  = ) , , , ( γ δ R C L + ) , ( R C U  
) , ( ) , ( R C IC R C J γ δ + , where  5 = n  and  2 = k . The determinant H of the matrix has the sign 
1 ) 1 ( − = − n  at an interior solution of the maximization problem (9). To develop H, we make 
use of the FOC and obtain  
 
0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
0 ] ) 1 ( [ ] [ ] ) ( [ 0
1 ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ 0 0
1 ] [ 0 0
1 ) 1 ( ] ) ( [ 0 0 ) ( ) 1 ( 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 ) (
) 1 (
y p
p G G G
y p V g V g u g
p p G p V g GV GV
G V g GV GV







− − − − − −
− − − − ′ −
− − − −
−




δ λ δ λ δ ω λ
λ δ λ λ λ
λ δ λ λ λ






where  ) (R g g = ,  ) (R G G = , and  A V  and  AA V , for example, denote the partial derivative and 
the second order partial derivative of  − + + − + + = ) ( )[ 1 ( ) ( ) , , ( b B A u p v A pu z B A V ] z  with 
respect to the severance pay A,  0 / ) , , ( > ∂ ∂ = A z B A V VA  and  0 / ) , , ( 2 2 < ∂ ∂ = A z B A V VAA . The 
partial  derivatives  of  the  FOC  with  respect  to  z  are  zero  with  the  exception  of 
= Rz L 0 ) 1 )( ( < − − p R g λ . Replacing the fifth column of H with the negative of  Rz L  yields 
the determinant  Rz H  
0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
0 ] ) 1 ( [ ] [ ] ) ( [ 0
1 ) 1 ( 0 0 0
1 0 0 0
1 ) 1 ( 0 0 0 ) ( ) 1 ( 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 ) (
) 1 (
p
p G G G
y p V g V g u g










− − − − − −
− − − − − ′ −
− −












The evaluation of  Rz H  yields 
  [ ] 0 )] ( ) ( ) 1 )[( 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 > + ′ ′ + ′ ′ − − + ′ ′ + ′ ′ − − − = v A u G u G w u v A u G p p H Rz Rz ω λ λ λ λ L .  
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Thus,  there  exists  a  strictly  decreasing 
1 C   function  ) (z R ,  ] , ( ) ( m R z R α ∈ :  = dz z dR / ) (  
< H HRz / 0. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 6. Replacing the third column of the determinant H of the Hessian matrix 
for the Lagrangian function with the negative of  Rz L  yields the determinant  Az H  
 
0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 ) 1 ( 0 ) 1 ( 1
0 ] ) 1 ( [ ] ) ( [ 0
1 ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ 0 0 0
1 ] [ 0 0 0
1 ) 1 ( ] ) ( [ 0 0 ) ( ) 1 ( 0




y p V g u g
p p G p V g GV
G V g GV








− − − − −
− − − − ′ −
− − − −
−




δ λ δ ω λ
λ δ λ λ
λ δ λ λ





The evaluation of  Az H  yields 
[ ] 0 )] ( ) ( [ ) 1 ( )] ( ) 1 ( ) ( [ ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 < ′ − + ′ − + ′ ′ − + ′ ′ − + ′ ′ − − = ω λ ω λ λ λ λ u v A u g u w u y G v A u G p p H Rz Az L  
Thus, there exists a strictly increasing 
1 C  function  ) (z A :  = dz z dA / ) ( > H H Az / 0. 
Replacing the second column of the determinant H of the Hessian matrix for the Lagrangian 
function with the negative of  Rz L  yields the determinant  z Hω  
0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 ) 1 ( 0 1
0 ] ) 1 ( [ ] [ 0
1 ) 1 ( ] ) 1 ( [ 0 0
1 ] [ 0 0
1 ) 1 ( ] ) ( [ 0 0 0 0




y p V g V g
p p G p V g GV GV









− − − −
− − − −
− − − −
−




δ λ δ λ
λ δ λ λ λ
λ δ λ λ λ





The evaluation of  z Hω  yields 
[ ] )] ( ) ( [ ) 1 ( )] ( ) ( ) 1 [( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 v A u u g w u v A u Gy v A u G p p H Rz z + ′ − ′ − + ′ ′ + + ′ ′ − + ′ ′ − − − = ω λ λ λ λ λ ω L . 
Because  v A+ = ω  for  0 = z , we get  0 > z Hω  and  = dz z d / ) ( ω < H H z / ω 0. Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3. Workers are risk-averse, so that the proposition follows directly from 
(16), (6) and  0 ) ( < α h : 
 
1 2 1
)) ( )( (
1
















= < . Q.E.D. 
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Proof of Lemma 7. The functions  ) (z Ri  are strictly decreasing and we know from Proposi-
tion  3  that  α α α = > ) ( ) (
2 2 2 1 z R z R   and  that  m R R R = = ) 0 ( ) 0 ( 2 1 .  We  will  show  now that 
dz dR dz dR / ) 0 ( / ) 0 ( 0 1 2 > >  applies for the derivatives  dz z dRi / ) (  at  0 = z . Assertions (ii) 
und (iii) follow directly.  























such that  0 ) ( / ) 1 ( / ) 0 ( 1 < ′ − − = m w u y p dz dR , because  m w w = ) 0 ( 1 . 
From the Hessian matrix for the Lagrangian function of the maximization problem (9) and 






)) ( 1 )( (
) ( )[ (










m m w u
w u
R g
R G R yG





such that the assertion can be proven by a comparison of the two derivatives  dz dRi / ) 0 (  for 
0 = z . 
 
A4 Proof of Proposition 4, Equation (17) and Lemma 8 - 10 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let  z ˆ  be the worker type being indifferent between the GEC and the 
type-specific SPC. The type-specific SPC includes the wages  α ω w w = =  and the severance 
pay  α ω y A − = . Under these contract terms,  z ˆ  is indeed indifferent between the two contract 
forms, while the firm employing  z ˆ  would choose the reservation productivity  α = R . Insert-
ing the terms of the SPC and  α = R  into the constraints of (9), we find that both are fulfilled 
as strict equalities. In view of  0 )] ( ) ( ))[ ( 1 ( = ′ − ′ − = w u u R G ω λ γ  and the FOC (14), it follows 
from 
(a1)    0 ] ˆ ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ( ) ˆ ( = − + − + − − − + − − ≡ z p y b w u p y v w pu w u g z R α α α λ α α α L   
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that the marginal worker is characterized by  } ˆ , 0 { max
3 z z = α . Risk-aversion together with 
0 ) ( < α h  and  0 ) (
3 ≤ α z R L  imply 
2 3 ) 1 ( ) ( )) ( ( ) 1 ( α α α α α z p w u h w u z p − = − − < − . It follows 
from (a1) and assumptions (A1) and (A2) that  α ≥ b  is sufficient for  0
3 > α z . 
Given  that  α ω w =   and  α α y w A − = ,  FOC  (14)  implies  that  0
3 > α z   applies  when 
) ) ( ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
3 α α α α α π α α α − − = + − − + + − < h w u b y w u p v y w pu w u .  However,  the  ine-
quality is satisfied if and only if 
3 ) ( α π α > − h . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 8. Ad (ii): Assume  0 ≤ γ , then the FOC (10) and (11) imply  w ≥ ω . More-
over, from the FOC (14)  ) 0 , 0 , ( ) , 0 , ( ) ( A V z A V u ≤ ≤ ω , such that  w v A ≥ > + ω . Next assume 
0 > γ , then (10) and (11) imply  w < ω , while from (12):  w v A > + , so that the proposition 
follows. Ad (iii): To prove that  ) (z R  is a strictly decreasing function of z, we develop the 
bordered  × + ) ( k n 6 6 ) ( × = + k n  Hessian matrix for the Lagrangian function  = ) , , , ( γ δ R CA L  
+ ) , ( R C U A ) , ( ) , ( R C IC R C J A A γ δ + , where  4 = n  and  2 = k . The determinant H of the matrix 
has the sign of  1 ) 1 ( + = − n  at an interior solution of the maximization problem (9) with unob-
servable  0 = B . To develop H, we make use of the FOC and obtain  
 
0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 ) 1 ( 1
0 ] [ ] ) ( [ 0
1 ] [ 0 0
1 ) 1 ( ] ) ( [ 0 ) ( ) 1 ( 0




y V g u g
G V g GV









− − ′ −
−




δ λ δ ω λ
λ δ λ λ





where  0 / ) , 0 , ( > ∂ ∂ = A z A V VA  and  0 / ) , 0 , ( 2 2 < ∂ ∂ = A z A V VAA . 
0 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 ) 1 ( 1
0 ] [ ) 1 /( 0
1 0 0 0
1 ) 1 ( 0 0 ) ( ) 1 ( 0




− − − −





















The  partial  derivatives  of  the  FOC  with  respect  to  z  are  zero  with  the  exception  of 
= Rz L 0 ) 1 )( ( < − − p R g λ . Replacing the fourth column of H with the negative of the partial  
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derivatives of the FOC with respect to z yields the above determinant  Rz H . The evaluation of 
Rz H  gives 
  0 ]] ) ( ) 1 )[( 1 ( ) ( [ ) 1 ( < + ′ ′ − − + ′ ′ − − = AA Rz Rz GV u G w u H ω λ λ λ λ L . 
Thus, R is a strictly decreasing function of z, as  0 / / ) ( < = H H dz z dR Rz . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Lemma 9. Ad (i): FOC (11) – (12) in conjunction with the incentive compatibility 
constraint  yR A − = ω   imply  − − + ′ − ′ − = ) ( ) ( ))[ ( 1 )( ( yR v u p u R G R G ω ω λ γ + ′ − ω ( ) 1 ( u p  
)] yR b − .  Given  that  0 ) ( ≥ ′ ′ ′ c u ,  the  marginal  utility  function  is  convex,  such  that 
))] ( ( ) ( ))[ ( 1 )( ( R h u p u R G R G − ′ − ′ − ≤ ω ω λ γ . Assume that  0 ) ( ≥ R h . It then follows from the 
convexity of u that  0 ≤ γ . This finding, in conjunction with FOC (14) and the convexity of u, 
implies that  z p I A u z A V u S ) 1 ( ) ( ) , 0 , ( ) ( − − + < ≤ ω . Substitution of the incentive compatibil-
ity constraint then yields  z p R h u u ) 1 ( )) ( ( ) ( − − − < ω ω , which implies  0 ) ( < R h  contradicting 
the assumption. Consequently  0 )) ( ( < z R h  for all  ) , 0 [
3 α z z∈ . Ad (ii): We can distinguish 
three alternatives. 1.  ) , 0 , ( ) ( z A V u > ω . It follows from FOC (14) that  0 > γ , which in turn 
implies together with FOC (10) - (12) that  ω > w  as well as  + + ′ > ′ > ′ ) ( ) ( ) ( v A u p w u u ω  
) ( ) 1 ( b A u p + ′ − . Given that the workers are prudent, the marginal utility functions are con-
vex, such that  ) ( ) ( ) ( S I A u w u u + ′ > ′ > ′ ω , which proves the assertion. 2.  ) , 0 , ( ) ( z A V u < ω . 
Then  0 < γ  and thus  ) ( ) ( w u u ′ < ′ ω , such that  w > ω . From (i) we know that  0 )) ( ( < z R h , 
what together with the incentive compatibility requirement yields  = + − = + S S I z yR I A ) ( ω  
w z R h > > − ω ω )) ( ( . 3.  ) , 0 , ( ) ( z A V u = ω . In that case,  0 = γ , such that  w = ω . Given that 
0 )) ( ( < z R h , the incentive compatibility constraint yields  w I A S = > + ω . 
We  now  turn  to  the  last  part  of  the  assertion.  Given  that  − + = ] ) ( [ ) ( S I z A z s  
)} ( ), ( { max z z w ω ,  it  follows  that  ) ( ] ) ( [ ) ( z I z A z s S ω − + ≤ .  Substitution  of  − = ) ( ) ( z z A ω  
) (z yR  yields the claim  )) ( ( ) ( z R h z s − ≤ . Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Equation (17). It follows from FOC (11) – (12) that  + ′ − = A u R G R G ( ))[ ( 1 )( ( λ γ  
)]]
~
( [ E )) ( S S S I I I A u R h I − + + ′ − + .  The  second  order  approximations  regarding  the  ex-
pected wage replacement  S I A+  are:  




S S S I A u I A u R h I A u R h I A u + ′ ′ ′ + + ′ ′ + + ′ ≅ + + ′    
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Substitution and factoring out the term  0 ) ( > + ′ ′ − S I A u  yields: 




S S S R h I A P R h I A u R G R G σ λ γ − + + − + ′ ′ − − ≅ . 
Given that 
2 2 2 ) ( S R R h σ σ − = , equation (17) follows.Q.E.D. 
 
Proof  of  Lemma  10.  Ad  (i):  The  derivative  of  2
R σ   for  R  is  0 ) ( 2 / 2 < = R yh dR d R σ   for 
) , [ m R R α ∈ . At the minimum of  2
R σ ,  S m I yR yR = =  and thus  2 2
S Rm σ σ = . Ad (ii): Substitu-
tion of  ] [ 1
S S y I σ ρ − =  in  2
R σ  yields 
2 2 2 ) )( 1 ( ) ( S S S S I b p I v p σ σ σ ρ + − − + + − = , which 
can be rewritten as 
2 2 2 2 2 ) )( 1 ( S S b v p p σ σ σ ρ = − − + = , such that  0 2 ) (
2 2 = − = S σ σ ρ ∆ ρ . Ad 
(iii):  Substitution  in  S S I y σ ρ − =   yields:  = − − − = ) 1 ( ) ( p p b v I y S ρ − − + p b v b )[ (  
] ) 1 ( p p − . For  ) 1 ( ) ( p p p p − − = η , it is true that  0 ) ( ≥ p η  for  ] 1 , [2
1 ∈ p , such that the as-
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